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In recent years, Chinese private companies have improved a lot in corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance,
especially in the philanthropic area. However, private companies’ awareness and performance of social responsibility
still have a big disparity with SOEs. And private companies’ policy of social responsibility is subjective and
preferential. To explain this contradiction, this paper tries to introduce political connection and, based on
stakeholder salience theory, to test how political connection changes managers’ perception of stakeholders’ relative
importance and cause changes in stakeholders’ satisfaction level of social responsibility requirement. The result
shows that (1) political connection has positive influence on private companies’ CSR; (2) companies with political
connection are significantly better than the ones without political connection in society-oriented and
customers-oriented responsibility; (3) two kinds of companies have no significant difference in investors-oriented
responsibility; (4) as for government-oriented and employee-oriented responsibility, companies with political
connection are worse than ones without political connection. These findings are significant for China’s future
construction of competition system and private companies’ choice of stakeholders and future investment.
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Chinese scholars’ discussion on Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR) developed rapidly from the 1990s.
The Chinese government gradually implemented a series
of laws, regulations and guidelines. The newly-amended
Company Law in 2005 first defined CSR on a perspec-
tive of law and pointed out clearly that a company
should improve the awareness of social responsibility
when pursing profitability. China’s SASAC issued the
Guidelines for Central Enterprises to Fulfill Social Re-
sponsibilities in 2008, which is the first normative docu-
ment of CSR issued by the ministry. The same year the
Shanghai Stock Exchange issued the Announcement
about Strengthening Listed Companies’ Performance of
Social Responsibility, which encourages listed companies
to publish their concrete performance towards stake-
holders’ social responsibility and appeals to companies* Correspondence: huanghf@phbs.pku.edu.cn
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifto issue corporate social responsibility reports. Govern-
ment’s efforts encouraged companies’ positive response.
According to the Research Report on Corporate Social
Responsibility of China (Huang et al. 2014) issued by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the CAGR of Chin-
ese CSR development index reached 16.80 % since 2009.
An important component of China’s economy, private
companies have become an important power that is
spurring China’s economic development expanding em-
ployment, and improving people’s well-being. In recent
years, a private company’s performance of social respon-
sibility is heading in the right direction. CSR’s content is
richer and includes charitable donation, fund raising, en-
vironment protection, and etc. (Xiao & Xu 2011). Private
companies are the backbone of donation. According to
Annual Report on China’s Philanthropy Development
(Yang 2009), the proportion of private companies’ total do-
nation is more than half of all companies’ donation. What
is the motivation that is pushing private companies to in-
crease their investment in CSR? Compared to state-owned
companies and foreign-funded companies, privateticle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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regulations for a long time. With a limited ability to obtain
resources, private companies’ survival and development
space are relatively small. During China’s economic transi-
tion, marketization has been low, and government’s inter-
vention in the economy has been strong. Key resources
which are vital to companies’ development are controlled
by government. Under these disadvantages, private com-
panies would, therefore, prefer to build and maintain con-
nections with government to advance their development.
In order to maintain political connection, based on the
reciprocity theory, companies should meet government’s
needs. Politically connected companies will increase its in-
vestment in CSR as the government focuses on social
responsibility.
However, private companies’ awareness and performance
of social responsibility still have a big disparity with other
types of companies, especially SOEs. Private companies’
CSR lacks systematization and purposefulness, and does
not possess a fixed management team that handles social
responsibility (Gu 2015). All these make private companies’
policy of social responsibility subjective and preferential.
For example, when private companies get actively involved
in philanthropy, they also become the subject of labor
trouble, security incidents, and quality issues. According to
the Report on Chinese Social Opinion and Crisis Manage-
ment (Lian 2014), more than 40 % of financial and eco-
nomic events are about private companies. Faced with the
contradiction of private companies’ performance in CSR,
this paper wants to provide an explanation from the stake-
holder theory. As business development’s process involves
many stakeholders, which are vital to companies’ survival
and development, companies should bear relative obliga-
tions and responsibilities (Clarkson 1995). If companies fail
to deal with the different stakeholders’ relationships, com-
panies’ sustainable development will be affected. However,
due to enterprises’ limited resources, firms cannot satisfy all
stakeholders’ needs. Donaldson & Perston (1995) consider
that not all stakeholders’ requirements are reasonable.
Therefore, firms should balance among diverse stake-
holders and satisfy stakeholders’ social responsibility re-
quirement selectively based on stakeholders’ importance.
Mitchell et al. (1997) defined stakeholders’ salience theory
based on their characteristics, legitimacy, power, and ur-
gency, which provide a theoretical basis for this paper.
Stakeholders’ salience is dynamic. And, stakeholders can
change managers’ perception of salience through the use of
political power and the foundation of alliances. For private
companies, the introduction of political connection may
change managers’ judgement toward stakeholders’ relative
importance, and, then, change the different stakeholders’
satisfaction level of social responsibility.
In summary, this paper attempts to answer the follow-
ing questions: (1) Under the background of economictransition, what is the impact of political connection on
private companies’ performance of social responsibility?
(2) Whether the introduction of political connection
changes managers’ perception of stakeholders’ relative
importance and, then, cause changes in stakeholders’ sat-
isfaction level of social responsibility requirement.
Literature review
Definition and measurement of Corporate Social
Responsibility
The researcher, who first proposed the concept of CSR,
is Oliver Sheldon. He defined CSR as a businessman
who satisfies the internal and external requirements. Be-
fore the 1960s, scholars used Social Responsibility of the
Businessman as the CSR undertaker, not the company.
Bowen, who is the Father of Corporate Social Responsi-
bility and who first systematically defined CSR, also
pointed out that the businessman has the responsibility
to develop policies in accordance with established social
goals and values, and a businessman’s voluntary per-
formance of social responsibility is the effective method
to improve the economy and achieve economic goals.
Until the 1970s, scholars tried to define CSR more
precisely and change the CSR undertaker from the
businessman to a company. To further define the
content and object of CSR, scholars formed two def-
inition methods.
(1)Levels of Analysis. Carroll’s interpretation is a classic in
a related field. He divided social responsibility into
economic responsibility, legal responsibility, ethical
responsibility and philanthropic responsibility. These
four categories of CSR might be depicted as a pyramid
from bottom to top. Economic responsibility, which is
the foundation of the other three responsibilities means
that companies have the responsibility to manufacture,
make profit, and satisfy customers’ needs. Legal
responsibility means the company should comply with
the laws and regulations promulgated by federal, state
and local governments as ground rules. Ethical
responsibility embraces those activities and practices
that are expected or prohibited by societal members
and embodies those standards, norms, or expectations
that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees,
shareholders, and the community regard as fair, just, or
in keeping with the interests or protection of
stakeholders’ moral rights. Philanthropic responsibility
encompasses those corporate actions that are in
response to society’s expectation that businesses be
good corporate citizens (Carroll 1979 & 1991).
(2)Stakeholder Perspective. This method is based on the
stakeholder theory that gained popularity in the
second half of the twenty-century. The combination
with stakeholder theory helps CSR research provide a
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method. It also provides a theoretical foundation.
Stakeholder theory is called by scholars the most
closely related theoretical framework within CSR. The
method, levels of analysis, verifies the content of CSR;
however, it does not solve the problem of whose re-
sponsibility CSR should be. The word “Social” in CSR
has not been clearly defined for a long time, giving a
simple understanding among people. The introduction
of CSR clarifies the meaning of “Social” (Carroll 1991).
The following is a discussion of stakeholder-
oriented responsibility. In order to define related
stakeholders of CSR, scholars have done a lot of re-
search. Most scholars agree that investors, employees,
and customers compose stakeholders. Besides the
above three, Freeman used a stakeholder map to in-
clude competitors, unions, and suppliers (Edward
1994). Based on the balance of stakeholders’ urgency,
power and legitimacy, government was incorporated
by Agle & Sonnenfeld (1999). According to Carroll’s
philanthropic responsibility, Li incorporated society
(Li 2006). With the extension of sustainable develop-
ment, the environment and community relations were in-
corporated (Waddock & Graves 2009). In addition,
women and minority groups, product or service quality
are sometimes mentioned (Greenley & Foxall 1998).
Based on data availability and according to a Shanghai
Stock Exchange’s document, the Announcement about
Strengthening Listed Companies’ Performance of Social
Responsibility, which mentioned shareholder, employee,
customer, creditor, community, and government, this
paper selects society, investors, customers, employees
and government as the five core stakeholders to discuss
political connection’s influence on different stakeholder’s
required responsibility. This paper defines CSR as part
of companies undertakings related to economic, legal,
ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities to core stake-
holders, and positive impact on stakeholders as de-
scribed in Table 1 below.
There are three commonly used CSR measuring
methods. (1) Content Analysis: This method mainly de-
termines score or numerical value of various aspects ofTable 1 Companies’ responsibility to stakeholders
Responsibility to Investors: Respo
Create more profits, guarantee investors’ capital safety, and pay
dividends or interests on time.
Provid
and p
Responsibility to Customers: Respo
The rational investment in R&D, production, sales, and after-sales
according to customers’ requirement in daily production activity.
The c
Responsibility to society:
Green production and charitable donation.social responsibility through collecting and analyzing
companies’ published reports, especially the annual re-
ports. (2) Reputation Index: This method calls industry
veterans to evaluate companies’ CSR policies and then
sort the sample companies. (3) Grade of Professional In-
stitutes: This method refers to the CSR database created
by professional institutes. The KLD index given by
American KLD Company is the most accepted and
widely used. In China, the authoritative and widely used
database is given by Rankings CSR Ratings (RKS).
Chinese scholars primarily use grades from profes-
sional institutes. However, when combining stakeholders
with CSR, Chinese scholars mainly utilize the question-
naire method and the content analysis method based on
financial reports for the lack of professional database
from the perspective of stakeholders such as the KLD
database. For questionnaires, the samples are always
small and the cost is high. So content analysis is mainly
used. Later, I summarize the research results that use fi-
nancial indicators to measure CSR.
Research based on government’s formulas
There are two basic formulas. One is the social con-
tribution rate given by China's Ministry of Finance in
1995. The other is the social contribution value per
share given by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2008.
Social contribution rate means that the company cre-
ates a contribution to society with certain assets. The
more contribution the company creates with the same
amount of assets, the higher the economic and social
benefits of the company. The formula is shown as
follows:
Social Contribution Rate ¼ Amount of Social Contribution
= Average Total Asset
The total amount of social contribution includes em-
ployees’ wages (bonuses, allowances, etc.), labor retire-
ment investment, and other social welfare expenditures,
net interest payments, value added tax payable, sales tax
and extra charges, other taxes, and net profit.
Social contribution value per share means the sum of
profits for shareholders and for other stakeholders. Thensibility to Employees:
e competitive wages and good benefits, ensure employees’ safety,
rovide abundant opportunities for employees’ growth and development.
nsibility to Government:
ompliance of laws and regulations and the payment of taxes on time
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pany has. The formula is shown as follows:Social Contribution Value per Share ¼ Earnings per Share þ Total Taxþ Employee Costþ Interest
Expenditure þ Public Welfare Expenditure− Social Cost
 
= Shareholder EquityMany scholars modify the above formulas to calculate
CSR and stakeholder-oriented responsibility. For the
social contribution rate formula, (Cheng 1995) used
sales income instead of total average assets to make it
more suitable for companies’ social achievements. Chen
& Ma (2005) used the data based on cash system of
accounting instead of the numerator based on accrual
basis to make the formula attract more users’ attention,
which is shown in Table 2.
According to previous researches, Zhou, Wang and
Liu calculated stakeholder-oriented social responsibility
based on Carroll’s division of CSR and quantifiable and
accessible data as seen in Table 3 (Zhou et al. 2008).
Zhu divided CSR’s objectives into internal and external
stakeholders, and measure the relevant investment with
absolute and relative method, shown in Table 4 below.
When calculating the total value of CSR, besides the
basic two formulas above, some researches make some
improvement, which is shown in Table 5.
The advantage of this method is calculations based on
government and relevant organizations’ formula, which
has a certain authority. The disadvantage is that it does
not consider stakeholders’ discrepancy of significance
and influence on a company.Weights endowed method
This method calculates total CSR based on the weight of
different stakeholders. However, the complexity and data
availability hinder the use of this method.
Shen calculated the weight of shareholders, creditors,
employees, consumers, suppliers, and government basedTable 2 Calculation of stakeholder-oriented responsibility
Stakeholders Contribution Rate
Contribution to Government (Tax Payments—Tax Returns)/Cash
Inflow From Operating Activities
Contribution to Employee Cash Paid to Employee and for
Employee / Prime Operating Revenue
Contribution to Investor Dividend and Interest Paid in Cash/
Prime Operating Revenue
Contribution to Society (Environment Expenditure + Donation +
Sponsorship Fee)/ Prime Operating
Revenueon comprehensive, quantitative, comparable, and oper-
ational principles (Shen & Shen 2003, 2004), shown in
Table 6 below. This method guided subsequent re-
searchers (Qiu & Xu 2005).
Gao and Peng calculated stakeholders’ weight from the
dynamic life-cycle perspective. According to companies’
period of founding, growing, maturing, and declining,
companies pay different attention on the same stake-
holders (Gao & Zhou 2011), shown in Table 7.
The above research results show that when measuring
stakeholder-oriented responsibility, the chosen indicators
do not have an impact. To measure a company’s contribu-
tion to society, scholars use donation expenses in non-
business expenditure part. To measure company’s contri-
bution to employee, scholars use the wage and welfare
rate and wage growth rate. To calculate the government-
oriented responsibility, scholars use tax ratio. For
customer-oriented responsibility, operating cost ratio and
sales growth rate are used. For investor-oriented responsi-
bility, net asset value per share, earnings per share, and
asset-liability ratio, are used. The specific calculation
method of this paper will be introduced in Chapter 4.Definition and measurement of political connection
Researches on political connection began in the 1970s.
Krueger pointed out that entrepreneurs could build con-
nection with government officials to bring economic ben-
efits (Krueger 1974). The definition of political connection
has not reached an agreement. In a narrow sense, political
connection is when corporate executives or major share-
holders have government working experience, or have aTable 3 Calculation of stakeholder-oriented responsibility
Stakeholders Contribution Rate
Contribution to Country (Tax Payments—Tax Returns)/
Prime Operating Revenue
Contribution to Employee Cash Paid to Employee and for Employee/
Prime Operating Revenue
Contribution to Investor Dividend and Interest Paid in Cash/
Prime Operating Revenue
Contribution to Society Public Welfare Paid in Cash/
Prime Operating Revenue
Table 4 Calculation of stakeholder-oriented responsibility
Absolute Value Indicator
Inner Stakeholders Staff Training Expenditure




Inner Stakeholders Staff Training Expenditure/Revenue
Staff Social Security Expenditure/Revenue
External Stakeholders Donation/Revenue
Pollution Control Expenditure/Revenue
Table 6 Calculation of CSR and stakeholder-oriented
responsibility
Item Formula
Stockholder Earnings per Share
Net Asset Value per Share
Creditor Interest Coverage Ratio
Equity to Asset Ratio
Customer COGSTS
Sales Growth Rate in 3 Years
Supplier Accounts Receivable Turnover
Ratio of Cash and Accounts Payable
Employee Wages and Welfare Ratio =Wages and Welfare /Net Profit
Wages and Welfare Growth Rate
Government Tax Ratio
Tax Growth Rate in 3 Years
Weight Stockholder’s Weight = Stock Equity/ Total Asset +
(Subject Equity/ Total Asset) * (Dividend /(Stockholder +
Creditor + Customer + Supplier + Employee + Government))
Creditor’s Weight = Loans/ Total Asset + (Subject Equity/
Total Asset) * (Interests /(Stockholder + Creditor +
Customer + Supplier + Employee + Government))
Other Stakeholders’ Weight = (Subject Equity/ Total Asset)
* (Other Related Stakeholder’s Expenditure /(Stockholder





(CSRi is the indicator of stakeholder-oriented responsibility.
Wi is stakeholder’s weight)
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sense, political connection is when a company has a close
connection with government actively or passively to pur-
sue self-development. Recessive political connection based
on entrepreneurs’ social relationships is also included in
political connection (Sun 2012). Considering the difficulty
and inscrutability to measure recessive political connec-
tion, scholars mainly focus on the narrow sense. The fol-
lowing summarizes several measurement method of
political connection depending on the background of each
country.
(1)Dummy Variable Method. Foreign scholars think if
the controlling shareholders, directors, or executives
are comprised of senators and ministers or have a
close connection with politicians, the company is seen
as having political connection, which equals to 1. If
not, political connection equals to 0 (Faccio 2006;
Francis et al. 2009). Chinese scholars think if the
executives (chairman and general manager; chairman
or general manager; the board of directors and
general manager; directors, supervisors, andTable 5 Formula of CSR
Scholar Formula
Gao & Zhou (2008) (Dividend Paid in Cash + Interest Paid in Cash +
Cash Paid to Employee and for Employee +
Cash Paid to Customer + Cash Paid for Goods
Purchased and Labor Services Received +
Actual Tax Paid)/ Prime Operating Revenue
Zhang & Liang (2012) (Dividend Paid in Cash + Interest Paid in Cash +
Cash Paid to Employee and for Employee +
Cash Paid to Customer + Cash Paid for Goods
Purchased and Labor Services Received +
Actual Tax Paid + Donation)/ Prime Operating
Revenue
Cao & Yu [2013] (Tax Payments—Tax Returns + Cash Paid to
Employee and for Employee + Dividend Paid
in Cash + Interest Paid in Cash + Notes
Payable + Accounts Payable)/ Prime
Operating Revenueexecutives) are or have been government officials, NPC
delegates, CPPCC delegates, Party Congress delegates,
et al., the company is seen as having political connection
which equals to 1. If not, political connection equals to 0
(Li 2010; Wang &Wu 2008; Yu & Pan 2008).
(2)Political Level Valuation Method. To better measure
the difference of political connection levels, some
scholars give different levels numerical values,
respectively. Political connection equals to 5 with
national connection; equals to 4 with provincial
connection; equals to 3 with municipal connection;
equals to 2 with county-level connection; equals to 1
with township-level connection; and equals to 0 with
no connection (Du et al. 2009; Wu 2014).
(3)Proportion Method. This method includes politically
connected executives of total executives, national-
connected executives of total executives, and local-
connected executives of total executives (Boubakri
2008; Deng & Zeng 2009; Qiu & Xu 2015).
Besides the above three methods, political donation
expenditure method (Goldman 2006), Suharto dependent
index (Fisman 2001), geographical factors analysis method
(Faccio & Parsley 2009) are additional methods used by
Table 7 Calculation of CSR and stakeholder-oriented
responsibility
Item Formula
Stockholder Dividend Paid in Cash/ Prime Operating
Revenue
Creditor Interest Expense/ Prime Operating Revenue
Employee Cash Paid to Employee and for Employee /
Prime Operating Revenue
Customer R & D/ Prime Operating Revenue
Supplier Cash Paid for Goods Purchased and Labor
Services Received/ Prime Operating Revenue
Government (Tax Payments—Tax Returns)/ Prime
Operating Revenue




- (Amercent Outlay + Compensation
Expenses + Overdue Fine)/ Prime
Operating Revenue




(Wi is the recognition level of stakeholders
in different life-cycles.)
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spending or political donation. Geographical factors mean
that the hometown of Congress members is the same as
corporate headquarters. However, these three methods’
applicable range is limited.
Considering China’s actual condition and the availabil-
ity of data, this paper uses the dummy variable method
and considers whether chairman of the board or general
manager is or had been a government official, NPC dele-
gates, CPPCC delegates, Party Congress delegates, then
political connection equals to 1. If not, political connec-
tion equals to 0. In the robust test part, this paper uses
political level valuation method.
Motivation of Corporate Social Responsibility
Motivations of companies’ performance of CSR are com-
plicated. To sum up, the motivations can be divided into
internal motivation and external pressure.
(1)Internal Motivation. Swanson considers internal
motivation includes positive-duty and utilitarian.
Positive-duty means that the company is willing to
perform social responsibility whether there exists
external factor or not. Utilitarian means that the per-
formance of CSR is to pursue self-performance goals
(Swanson 1995). Scholars after Swanson are based on
his results. Even though the name is different, the
connotation is similar. For example, Li et al. (2010)
distinguished between value-driven factor and
performance-driven factor; (Sánchez 2006) pointedout altruistic motive and profit maximization motive;
and Aguilera et al. (2007) used moral motive and
instrumental motive. Agent theory is applied to
motivation research and forms over-investment
hypothesis (Barnea &Rubin 2010; Goel &Thakor 2008;
Gompers 2003). Executivesmay over invest in social
responsibility in order to build their own social reputation
when they are in charge of companies’ operation.
(2)External Pressure. Negative-duty is an explanation
of external pressure given by Swanson, which
means CSR is companies’ passive response to
external stakeholders (Swanson 1995).
Stakeholder-driven theory (Li et al. (2010),
political and institutional power motive (Sánchez
2000), relational motive (Aguilera 2007) are also
mentioned by scholars.
The classification of internal motivation and external
pressure is simple; however, there may exist some over-
lap, which is hard to distinguish. Godfrey (2005) used
company strategic motives in CSR motivation analysis
and combined utilitarianism with external pressure.
China’s CSR motivation researchers mainly learn from
foreign research results and use external and internal
methods. Sun and Zhong divided the motivation factors
into economic motivation (including value-added driven
and agent problem) and non-economic motivation (in-
cluding politically driven and morally driven). SOEs’
CSR is mainly driven by agent problems, and private
companies’ CSR is mainly driven by value-added and
political protection (Su 2011). Zhang (2013) proposed
the structure of “Competition-Commitment-Compli-
ance” based on Swanson’s theory. Competition means
that CSR performance is to satisfy companies’ target of
self-profits and overcoming the competition. Commit-
ment is companies’ or executives’ contribution to society
based on their philosophy. Compliance means compan-
ies execute social responsibility according to external
pressure (Fig. 1).
This paper treats political connection’s influence as
the combination between internal utilitarian and exter-
nal political pressure, which will be discussed in the next
part in detail.
Political connection and Corporate Social Responsibility
Internal utilitarian
Based on resource effect of political connection, it is an
important social capital. Companies can obtain required
key resources through political connection, which is in
accordance with utilitarianism.
Political connection’s resource effect researches are
comprehensive and in-depth from basic theory to empir-
ical analysis. For fund-raising, political connection can
help connected companies to obtain bank loans more
Fig. 1 CSR motivation
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Connected companies can improve the ability of capital ac-
quisition through a high corporate quality signal (Hu 2006).
For government’s support and protection, political connec-
tion allows for s more tax preference for connected com-
panies, and they would remove barriers more easily and
then improve competitiveness and values (Faccio 2006;
Wang & Wu 2008; Luo & Huang 2008). When facing diffi-
culty, politically connected companies may obtain more
government assistance. Political connection can also be the
alternative mechanism for imperfections in the economic
and legal systems to protect companies’ property from gov-
ernment damage (Sun 2005; Yu & Pan 2008).
External political pressure
According to social exchange theory, establishing, main-
taining, and improving political connection require com-
panies’ investment to meet government’s need. With
government’s increased attention on CSR, companies are
pressed to perform social responsibility.
Aronson, Wilson and Akert (2005) considered that polit-
ical connection is a recessive contract. Based on reciprocity
and fairness principle of social exchange, companies should
help government solve problems when they receive help
from government. In the CSR field, government tries to
maintain society’s stability and development, and officials
strive to increase their achievements. Therefore, they expect
companies to bear relevant social responsibility through re-
cessive contracts of political connection (Li 2010). To main-
tain and improve this recessive contract, a company may
step forward to fill government needs and bear social re-
sponsibilities, which originally belonged to government
(Zhang & Liang 2012). Thus, political connection has posi-
tive influence on companies’ performance on social respon-
sibility. In fact, the higher the political connection level, the
better companies take responsibility (Yi & Xu 2014).
In terms of the relationship between political connec-
tion with donation, researches show that politically con-
nected companies are more prone to accept government
apportions and have a higher propensity to donate. Jia and
Zhang analyzed companies’ motivation to donate based
on sample contributions after the 2008 Wenchuanearthquake. They proposed that maintaining and improv-
ing relationship with government is a main reason that
causes companies to donate assets (Jia & Zhang 2010).
Scholars also find that Chinese companies can build polit-
ical connection through charity activities, and then get
more loans, investing opportunities, etc. (Su & He 2009).
Political connection’s influence on enterprises, however,
is not always positive. Close connection with government
will sometimes spur a decrease in stock value and sales
growth when the government is faced with negative
rumors such as a leader’s health deterioration or death
(Faccio & Parsley 2007; Fisman & Wang 2015). Some
researchers found that compared with connected companies,
non-connected companies demonstrate a better performance
on sales returns and profit growth (Fan et al. 2007; Wang &
Wu 2008). In the social responsibility field, some researchers
pointed out that political connection may be a cause for com-
panies’ immoral activities because government is less stringent
on regulation. Fan et al. (2007) found that Chinese politically
connected companies will useGuanxi to bypass labor protec-
tion laws and regulations to decrease cost and increase profit.
Dong and Luo found that party organization in private com-
panies does not improve employees’ wages from the perspec-
tive of the relationship between party and companies
(Dong et al. 2014). Fisman’s and Wang’s research shows that
the death rate of political connected companies is 2–3 times
higher than non-connected companies, which is attributed to
connected companies use of Guanxi to bypass government’s
safety checks and regulations and decreasing investments in
employees’safe work environment and environmental protec-
tion (Fisman&Wang 2015).
Stakeholder saliency theory
Currently, researches on stakeholder theory can be di-
vided into description analysis, instrumental analysis,
and normative analysis. Description analysis mainly
solves the question of who are companies’ stakeholders.
In this paper, we choose investors, customers, em-
ployees, government, and society as the stakeholders. In-
strumental analysis discusses stakeholders’ influence on
business strategy and the stakeholder management strat-
egy based on the analysis of the relationship between
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gets. It also includes the research of stakeholders’ ana-
lysis, which is the core of this paper. Normative analysis
attempts to prove the rationality of stakeholder theory
from an abstract perspective.
Instrumental researches consider that companies cannot
satisfy all stakeholders’ requirement and companies
should prioritize stakeholders based on their relative im-
portance and then meet their needs tactically. The con-
cept of salience is formed as a result of managerial
evaluations of stakeholders’ priority levels when they deal
with conflicting stakeholders’ needs. In other words, sali-
ence is the ranking of stakeholders from a manager’s per-
ception (Mitchell et al. 1997). Salience is a comprehensive
judgment of stakeholders’ value and distinguishes import-
ant and unimportant stakeholders. The stakeholder sali-
ence research is based on Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s
achievement, which uses stakeholders’ legitimacy, urgency
and power to determine salience. Power means the ability
and method of a stakeholder to affect company’s decision.
Legitimacy means a stakeholder’s obligations given by
laws, regulations and social duty. Urgency means a stake-
holder’s requirement or demand can be taken into ac-
count or solved by managers. Figure 2 shows the
relationship among stakeholders’ three characteristics.
Mitchell pointed out that if a stakeholder has at least
one characteristic of the three, it can get the companies’
attention. Scholars apply this theory into CSR, discuss the
importance of different stakeholders for CSR, and then
devise CSR strategy. Agle & Sonnenfeld (1999) found that
CSR is directly related to stakeholders. In addition, increas-
ing consumer’s and government’s importance will increase
the performance level of social responsibilit. Maignan and
Ralston (Maignan & Ralston 2002) found that consumers
and community are the most important participants that
push companies to partake in environmental social
responsibility. For SMEs, the most important stakeholders
are government (Williamson et al. 2006), competitors
(Jenkins 2006) and consumers (Perrini et al. 2007).Fig. 2 Relational graph of stakeholder salienceIn conclusion, companies can judge stakeholders’ im-
portance based on power, urgency and legitimacy. Fur-
thermore, stakeholder salience is constantly changing
without a fixed property. Stakeholders can use political
power, the foundation of alliance, etc. to change their re-
lationships to companies and change the perceptive sali-
ence (Mitchell et al. 1997). Take power for example.
Power is a relative concept that needs to comprehen-
sively compare stakeholder and companies’ resource
capability. From a static point of view, a stakeholder
holds the key resources that a company needs to survive
and develop. This forces a company’s reliance on stake-
holders, increasing stakeholder power. If this stakeholder’s
needs are not satisfied, he may use power to control the in-
flow of key resources and force the company to do as he
wants. From the dynamic point of view, if the company finds
substitute resources or its self-capacity is gradually strength-
ened, the dependency on stakeholder would decrease and
the stakeholder’s power would also decrease. Therefore, the
relationship between company and stakeholders is inter-
dependent, dynamic and unfixed (Svendsen & Laberge
2005). For private companies, the introduction of political
connection will change managers’ perception of stake-
holders’ relative importance and then influence companies’
satisfaction of stakeholders’ social responsibility requirement.
Hypothesis development
Political connection and Corporate Social Responsibility
Resource dependence theory holds that an organization
is an open system and all resources that the organiza-
tion’s needs cannot be fulfilled internally; therefore, these
needs must be met externally.. The more important,
scarce and irreplaceable the required resources, the dee-
per dependence of the organization are on an external
resource supplier (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). China is at
the critical stage of economic transformation process,
and government controls key resources companies need
for survival and development Therefore, the government
becomes the most significant source of dependence for
Huang and Zhao International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility  (2016) 1:9 Page 9 of 19companies. Compared with state-owned companies with
close ties to the government and foreign-funded com-
panies supported by government, private companies are
treated unjustly in terms of laws and regulations. They
are at a disadvantage because of this. To achieve sustain-
able survival and development, companies should build
good relationships with local governments actively and
positively. Based on this relationship, companies could
get preferential policies, like financing, tax preference,
etc. and survive in a fierce market competition. Most
government policies are made by officials. They will co-
operate with interest groups due to an interest demand
and share the rent, which is called political rent creation.
Sometimes government officials will use the method of
promulgating bad policies to an interest group to ex-
change benefits, which is called political rent extraction
(McChesney 1987). Based on this theory, politically con-
nected companies should pay for this relationship to
meet government’s needs when they accept preferential
policies from the government. With economic develop-
ment, government is paying more attention to compan-
ies’ performance of social responsibility and issued
relevant laws and regulations to address this. Faced with
government’s expectation, private companies will imple-
ment social responsibility to meet expectations. Hence,
this paper makes the first hypothesis.
H1: Private companies’ political connection has a
positive influence on corporate social responsibility.Political connection and stakeholder-oriented
responsibility
CSR is critical for companies’ production and develop-
ment and is the foundation of sustainable development.
Only performing social responsibility and coordinating
stakeholders’ relations can companies realize gradual im-
provement and strategic targets. However, due to enter-
prises’ limited resources, companies cannot satisfy all
stakeholders’ needs. Donaldson and Perston (Donaldson
& Preston 1995) consider that not all stakeholders’ re-
quirements are reasonable. Therefore, companies should
balance different stakeholders’ requirements. According to
stakeholder salience theory, companies and managers can
justify different stakeholders’ importance to them based
on stakeholders’ characteristics of legitimacy, urgency and
power. Stakeholder salience is constantly changing with-
out fixed properties. Stakeholders can use political power,
and the foundation of alliance to change their image to
companies and then change the perceptive salience
(Mitchell et al. 1997). Therefore, the introduction of polit-
ical connection will change managers’ perception of stake-
holders’ relative importance and then influence
companies’ satisfaction to stakeholders’ social responsibil-
ity requirement.The following will discuss the detail relationship be-
tween political connection and stakeholder-oriented re-
sponsibility and make the second hypothesis.
Society orientation
Companies’ society-oriented responsibility use donations
as the principal thing, which is defined as funds or goods
that are voluntarily provided for free to government or
related organizations by companies (Financial Account-
ing Standards 1993). However, the reality of practice and
definition is very different. Companies’ beneficence is a
purposive behavior to a large extent, which is called stra-
tegic philanthropy. Government has the function to
maintain social stability, like helping refugees and vul-
nerable groups, which needs massive government spend-
ing and puts great pressure on public finances.
Therefore, government needs to find a supplementary
resource to remedy the lack of related investment. For
politically connected companies, they would be willing
to be the input-completer in order to improve govern-
ment credibility, maintain the existing relationship with
government and then get more key resources from the
government. According to agency cost theory, managers
need to obtain approval of the public and government, if
they want to become an official. Carroll’s Pyramid of
CSR thinks that philanthropic responsibility is at the top
of the pyramid, which can more easily get approval and
is the important channel for managers to build and
maintain political connection (Ma & Parish 2006).
Hence, this paper makes hypothesis 2a.
H2a: Private companies’ political connection has a
positive influence on companies’ contribution to
society-oriented responsibility.
Investor orientation
As companies’ main capital sponsor, investors are most
concerned whether their capital will receive a correspond-
ing return. Therefore, company’s responsibility to investors
is to create more profits, guarantee investors’ capital safety,
and pay dividends or interests on time. Political connection
as an important social capital can improve companies’ abil-
ity to obtain capital to reduce entry barriers, and then help
to improve competitiveness and values (Hu 2006; Faccio et
al. 2006; Wang & Wu 2008). At the same time, political
connection can strengthen controlling shareholders’ dom-
inance of the board of directors, restrain executives’ oppor-
tunism behavior effectively, decrease the companies’ over-
investment, and improve the efficiency of investment; thus,
laying the foundation for attaining investment earnings
(Chen & Zhu 2009). When facing difficulty, politically con-
nected companies may obtain more assistance from the
government, which protects capital safety to some degrees
(Sun et al. 2005; Yu & Pan 2008). Hence, this paper makes
hypothesis 2b.
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positive influence on companies’ contribution to
investor-oriented responsibility.
Customer orientation
From private companies’ development history, one of
the important reasons that they can compete with
SOEs and foreign-funded enterprises without govern-
ment support and become a new source of China’s
economic growth is to maintain a consumer service
orientation. Companies’ responsibility to consumers is
a voluntary social responsibility. This can be commu-
nicated to the public with superior performance and
a good social reputation, and then form competition
superiority, which can also be a good way to build
and maintain political connection. In recent years,
product safety incidents have caught the attention of
the government and consumers. Connected compan-
ies will be harmed more if they are linked to these
safety concerns. Higher market share and better abil-
ity to enter barriers and obtain projects make politic-
ally connected companies invest more on consumers.
Hence, this paper makes hypothesis 2c.
H2c: Private companies’ political connection has a
positive influence on companies’ contribution to
customer-oriented responsibility.
Government orientation
Companies’ contribution to government-oriented re-
sponsibility can be measured by the actual tax burden.
According to political cost hypothesis, government
would implement stronger regulation on larger-scale
enterprises and make them bear a higher tax burden
(Zimmerman 1983). For politically connected compan-
ies, they always have a larger assets scale and draw
higher attention from the media, government, and tax
department than non-connected companies, which
makes connected companies’ tax position consistent
with political cost hypothesis. However, according to
political power hypothesis, larger-scale enterprises can
obtain more resources and have a higher ability of rev-
enue sharing and affect government’s formulation of tax
policy, which can help decrease companies’ tax burden.
Political connection can have the same influence as
companies’ scale to decrease the effective tax rate
(Feng 2012). This paper agrees with political power hy-
pothesis. According to China’s reality of relation-based
society, tax laws and regulations have a strong policy-
based characteristic and government has a strong ability
to determine companies’ payable taxes and tax prefer-
ence, which makes officials’ power to create rent. Politic-
ally connected companies will use their political
resources to build a favorable tax environment. Hence,
this paper makes hypothesis 2d.H2d: Private companies’ political connection has a
negative influence on companies’ contribution to
government-oriented responsibility.
Employee orientation
Companies’ contribution to employee-oriented respon-
sibility states that companies should provide competi-
tive wages and good benefits, ensure employees’
safety, and provide abundant opportunities for em-
ployees’ growth and development. However, some re-
searchers found that political connection will cause
companies’ moral cost. Politically connected compan-
ies will use Guanxi to bypass labor protection laws
and regulations to decrease cost and increase profit
(Fan et al. 2007), which may cause a higher death
rate than non-connected companies (Fisman & Wang
2015). In recent years, labors’ income compared to
the national income has decreased. China’s labor mar-
ket is in buyer’s monopoly situation and dispersive la-
bors are in a weak position when negotiating with
employers, which makes companies’ tendency to re-
duce the investment in employees. For connected
companies, political connection makes them have
more channels to get resources and then decrease
their attention on employees. Meanwhile, behavior of
rent contribution may decrease the investment to em-
ployees. Hence, this paper makes hypothesis 2e.
H2e: Private companies’ political connection has a




In 2008, the Guidelines for Central Enterprises to Fulfill
Social Responsibilities issued by SASAC and the An-
nouncement about Strengthening Listed Companies’
Performance of Social Responsibility issued by the
Shanghai Stock Exchange symbolized a new stage in
Chinese CSR. Therefore, this paper uses the year of 2008
as a starting-point and chooses A-share listed private
companies during 2008-2014 as original samples to
make the empirical test.
Executives’ background materials are from Private
Listed Companies’ Database in CSMAR and political
connection data is manually collected through these ex-
ecutives’ resumes. Data of the institutional environment
is from China's Marketization Index (2015) published by
Fan and Wang. Data to calculate CSR are from the an-
nual reports. Other financial data are from Wind.
This paper screens out some unsuitable samples
based upon the following principles. (1) All financial
companies including bank, securities, insurance, etc.
are excluded because their substantial difference with
non-financial companies. (2) Samples are excluded
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ation income is vanishing, total assets are zero, or
owner's equity is negative. (3) Listed companies that
are specially treated as ST and *ST are excluded. (4)
In order to avoid IPO effect, sample firms listed in
and after 2008 are excluded. Lastly, this empirical re-
search has 2590 samples of 370 listed private com-
panies in 7 years.
According to Industry Classification Benchmark pub-
lished by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in
2002, the sample companies’ industrial distribution is
shown in Table 8, and companies in the manufacturing
industry, real estate industry and wholesale and retail
trade industry occupy the first three positions.Dependent variables: CSR
In the literature review part, we have summarized different
methods to calculate CSR. Based on existing results and fig-
ures’ quantity and availability, this paper chose content ana-
lysis method to measure companies’ contribution to
investor, consumer, employee, government and society’s re-
quired responsibility from companies’ expenses perspective.Society orientation
Companies’ responsibility to society mainly means
whether companies contribute their benefits to society
during daily production and management. Therefore,
this index selects the donation, sponsorship fee, environ-
mental expenditure, etc. in non-business expenditure
part of the annual report. The ratio of these figures’ sumTable 8 Industry distribution of sample companies
Industry Number Proportion
Mining Industry 10 2.70 %
Electricity, Heat, Gas and Water Production
and Supply Industry
3 0.81 %
Real Estate 34 9.19 %
Construction Industry 11 2.97 %
Scientific Research and Technological Services 2 0.54 %
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry and Fishery 7 1.89 %
Wholesale and Retail Trade 31 8.38 %
Water Resources, Environment and Public
Facilities Management
1 0.27 %
Health and Social Work 1 0.27 %
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 3 0.81 %
Information Transmission, Software and
Information Technology Services
16 4.32 %
Industry 240 64.86 %
Hotels and Catering Services 1 0.27 %
Comprehensive Industry 6 1.62 %
Renting and Commercial Services 4 1.08 %to prime operating revenue is a measure of companies’
fulfilled degree to society. The higher the ratio, the bet-
ter the companies’ society-oriented performance.
Society Orientation ¼ Donation þ Sponsorship Fee





 10000= Prime Operating revenue
Companies’ responsibility to employees includes pro-
viding competitive wages and good benefits, ensuring
employees’ safety, and providing abundant opportunities
for employees’ growth and development. This paper
chooses cash paid to employee and for employee and
calculates the ratio of this index to prime operating rev-
enue as the measurable indicator of companies’ fulfilled
degree to employee. The higher the ratio, the better the
companies’ employee-oriented performance.
Employee Orientation ¼ Cash Paid to Employee and for Employee
= Prime Operating Revenue
Investor orientation
Company’s responsibility to investors is to create more
profits, guarantee investors’ capital safety, and pay dividends
or interests on time. This paper chooses cash paid as divi-
dend and interest and calculate the ratio of this index to
prime operating revenue as the measurable indicator of
companies’ fulfilled degree to investor. The higher the ratio,
the better the companies’ investor-oriented performance.
Investor Orientation ¼ Dividend and Interest Paid in Cash
= Prime Operating Revenue
Customer orientation
Companies should perform their responsibility to con-
sumers, which includes the rational investment in
R&D, production, sales and after-sales, etc. according
to consumers’ requirement in the daily production ac-
tivity. Based on past researches, companies’ investment
in consumer-oriented responsibility can be measured
by prime operating cost, the ratio of this to prime op-
erating revenue can be used as the measurable indica-
tor of companies’ fulfilled degree to consumer. The
higher the ratio, the better the companies’ consumer-
oriented performance.
Customer Orientation ¼ Prime Operating Cost
= Prime Operating Revenue
Government orientation
Companies should perform their responsibility to gov-
ernment, which contains the compliance of laws and
regulations, and the payment of taxes on time. This
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index to prime operating revenue as the measurable in-
dicator of companies’ fulfilled degree in government.
The higher the ratio, the better the companies’
government-oriented performance.
Government Orientation ¼ Actual Paid Taxes
= Prime Operating Revenue
Aggregative indicator of CSR
As the whole CSR is not this paper’s research focus, so I
chose the measurement method based on government’s
formula, which neglect the proportion of each stake-
holder. The formula I chose is the social contribution
rate given by China's Ministry of Finance in 1995.
Social Contribution Rate ¼ Amount of Social Contribution
= Average Total Asset
Many scholars use and improve this above formula. As
aforementioned, Cheng (1995) used the sales income in-
stead of total average assets to make it more fit for com-
panies’ social achievements. Chen and Ma (2005) used the
data based on cash system of accounting instead of the
numerator based on accrual basis to make the formula at-
tract more users’ attention. Based on these scholars, we
can get the following CSR measuring formula.
CSR Index ¼ ðDonation þ Sponsorship Fee þ Fundsþ Environmental Expenditureþ Cash Paid to Employee and for Employeeþ Dividend and Interest Paid in Cash
þ Prime Operating Cost þ Actual Paid Taxes
Þ
= Prime Operating Revenue
Independent variables: political connection
In literature review part, we have summarized diverse
methods to measure political connection. Combined with
China’s national condition and the availability of data, this
paper uses dummy variable method and considers that if
chairman of the board or general manager is or was gov-
ernment official, NPC delegates, CPPCC delegates, Party
Congress delegates, et al., political connection equals to 1.
If not, political connection equals to 0.
Control variables
Combining existing researches, this paper chooses com-
pany scale, financial efficiency, duality, company growth
and fixed asset ratio, and also controls for year and
industry’s effect.
Company scale has an important influence on CSR. Gai-
net (Gainet 2011) found that in the European market com-
pany scale has a positive effect on CSR. However, Deng &
Dart (1999) held that middle- and small-sized enterprises
would be more inclined to respond stakeholders’ needs
quickly to get more developing opportunities because theyreceived fewer resources than large enterprises . As a result,
SMEs would invest more in CSR. This paper will use the
logarithm of total assets to measure company scale. Many
researchers consider that financial efficiency has a close re-
lationship with CSR (Helwege et al. 2007). This paper uses
return on assets (ROA) to measure financial efficiency.
President’s responsibility is to organize and supervise the
companies’ operation and production. General Manager’s
responsibility is to take charge of the specific operation and
production. Researches show that duality would make the
companies lack a balance mechanism that executives could
make use of decision behavior to grab individual interests
and potentially harm other stakeholders’ interests (Wang et
al. 2015). To measure duality, this paper uses the dummy
variable method. If there exists a duality situation, it equals
to 1. If not, it equals to 0. From the growth perspective,
companies would make different choices in investing and
distributing profits in different development periods. For
example, companies in growth period prefer to choose
investing instead of sharing profits. This paper chooses rev-
enue growth rate to measure company growth. From a
fixed asset ratio perspective, the higher index means that
companies invest more on fixed asset and then reduce
companies’ cash flow and influence their CSR investment.
The following Table 9 summarizes all variables.
Model design
To test the two hypotheses, this paper uses the following
regression models. To solve endogenous of political con-
nection, company scale, financial efficiency and CSR, I
use the first-lagged method (Lin et al. 2014).
H1:
CSR ¼ α0 þ α1POLCt−1 þ α2SIZEt−1 þ α3ROAt−1




¼ α0 þ α1POLCt−1 þ α2SIZEt−1 þ α3ROAt−1




Table 10 lists samples’ political connection informa-
tion. For overall samples, the non-political connected
samples are dominant and political connected samples
only occupy 26.06 % of the total. However, as time
goes by, the number of political connected samples
continues to rise.
Table 9 Definition and explanation of variables
Type Name Code Description
Dependent Variables CSR CSR (Donation + Sponsorship Fee + Funds + Environmental Expenditure +
Cash Paid to Employee and for Employee + Dividend and Interest Paid
in Cash + Prime Operating Cost + Actual Paid Taxes) / Prime Operating
Revenue
Society Orientation SOCO (Donation + Sponsorship Fee + Funds + Environmental
Expenditure)*10,000 / Prime Operating Revenue
Employee Orientation EMPO Cash Paid to Employee and for Employee / Prime Operating Revenue
Investor Orientation INVO Dividend and Interest Paid in Cash / Prime Operating Revenue
Customer Orientation CUSO Prime Operating Cost/ Prime Operating Revenue
Government Orientation GOVO Actual Paid Taxes/ Prime Operating Revenue
Independent Variables Political Connection POLC If chairman of the board or general manager is or had been
government official, NPC delegates, CPPCC delegates, Party Congress
delegates, et al., POLC equals to 1. If not, POLC equals to 0.
Control Variables Company Scale SIZE Log (Total Asset)
Financial Efficiency ROA ROA
Duality DUAL If the general manager and chairman is one person, DUAL equals to 1.
If not, Dual equals to 0.
Company Growth GROW The growth rate of main operation income
Fixed Asset Ratio FIX Fix Asset/ Total Asset
Year YEAR 7 year, Dummy Variable
Industry IND 15 industries, according to CSRC’s industry classification standard (2012)
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minimum value is 0.396 and the maximum value is
3.816. According to the five core stakeholders we
chose, companies invest the most in customer orien-
tation, which is higher than the other four stake-
holders’ orientation. When divided into connected
and non-connected samples, through comparing the
average, we can see that connected samples’ CSR
performance is better than non-connected samples’.
A similar situation is found in samples’ investment
in society, investor, and customer’s responsibility. For
the investment to employee and government, non-
connected samples’ performance is better than con-
nected samples’. Based on descriptive statistics, the
results are consistent with H1 and H2 (Table 11).Table 10 Descriptive statistics of samples by year
Year Non-political Connection Political Connection
2008 277 74.86 % 93 25.14 %
2009 277 74.86 % 93 25.14 %
2010 273 73.78 % 97 26.22 %
2011 273 73.78 % 97 26.22 %
2012 272 73.51 % 98 26.49 %
2013 272 73.51 % 98 26.49 %
2014 271 73.24 % 99 26.76 %
Total 1915 73.94 % 675 26.06 %For control variables, connected companies’ company
scale and financial efficiency are higher than non-
connected companies’. The opposite situation exists for
fixed asset ratio and companies’ growth rate (Table 12).
Correlation analysis
To avoid multicollinearity problem, this paper uses Pear-
son two-tailed test to test the correlation among differ-
ent variables.
For dependent variables, they are correlated at 1 % sig-
nificance level and the coefficients are relatively high;
however, they are not higher than 50 %. For other vari-
ables, most of them are correlated at 10 % or under the
significance level and the coefficients are relatively low,
the highest of which is 13 % (Table 13).
Regression analysis on political connection and CSR
Based on the characteristics of samples, this paper chose
pooled least squares method because the period of time is
relatively short, just 7 years, and the independent variable,
political connection, and range ability is relatively small.
Meanwhile, in the test, there exists heteroskedasticity and
this paper will use robust method to solve heteroskedasti-
city and later will announce robust standard error.
Regression results for H1 and H2 are shown below.
From Table 14, for CSR connected private companies’
performance is better than non-connected private compan-
ies’ at 1 % significance level and H1 is supported. From
control variables, company scale and duality do not
Table 11 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables
Samples Political Connection Non-political Connection
Mean SD MIN MAX Mean SD MIN MAX Mean SD MIN MAX
CSR 1.001 0.433 0.396 3.816 1.061 0.457 0.396 3.816 0.980 0.423 0.396 3.816
SOCO 6.597 12.714 0.000 81.619 8.515 15.174 0.000 81.619 5.845 11.528 0.000 81.619
EMPO 0.111 0.095 0.006 0.540 0.094 0.082 0.006 0.540 0.117 0.099 0.006 0.540
INVO 0.054 0.062 0.000 0.410 0.060 0.069 0.000 0.410 0.052 0.059 0.000 0.410
CUSO 0.733 0.178 0.165 1.065 0.744 0.169 0.165 1.065 0.729 0.180 0.165 1.065
GOVO 0.071 0.081 −0.047 0.563 0.070 0.089 −0.047 0.563 0.071 0.078 −0.047 0.563
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growth rate, and fixed asset ratio are negatively related to
CSR at 1 % significance level. High return on assets and
company growth rate mean that companies can make good
use of assets and make high profit to receive rapid growth.
To maintain and improve the current level, companies will
invest more money on the daily operation or investing op-
portunities. The high fixed asset ratio means that compan-
ies invest more on fixed asset and then reduce companies’
cash flow and impact their CSR investment.
For society-oriented responsibility, connected companies’
contribution is higher than non-connected private compan-
ies’ at 1 % significance level. H2a is supported in that private
companies’ political connection has a positive influence on
companies’ contribution to society-oriented responsibility.
As control variables, company scale, duality, and company
growth rate do not have significant influence, which is par-
tially true because companies have not formed long-term
strategic charity plan and most contribute to emergencies
with great influence (Wang 2013). From a descriptive statis-
tics part, we can see that companies’ performance of society
orientation is highest in 2008. Furthermore, private com-
panies’ philanthropic responsibility is closely related to en-
trepreneurs’ self-value and experience. The above two
reasons can also be used to explain the relatively low R2.
For investor-oriented responsibility, political connec-
tion’s coefficient is 0.0017 and not significant, which
means political connection does not have significant in-
fluence and H2b is unsupported. So there is no signifi-
cant relationship between political connection and
investor-oriented responsibility.Table 12 Descriptive statistics of the control variables
Sample Political Connect
MEAN SD MIN MAX MEAN SD
SIZE 21.494 1.168 18.474 24.586 21.734 1.172
ROA 0.065 0.069 −0.161 0.338 0.069 0.064
DUAL 0.229 0.420 0.000 1.000 0.187 0.390
FIX 0.221 0.154 0.001 0.654 0.213 0.154
GROW 0.244 0.938 −0.796 7.766 0.241 0.937For customer-oriented responsibility, connected com-
panies’ contribution is higher than non-connected pri-
vate companies’ at 10 % significance level. H2c is
supported in that private companies’ political connection
has a positive influence on companies’ contribution to
customer-oriented responsibility.
For government-oriented responsibility, connected
companies’ contribution is lower than non-connected
private companies’ at 10 % significance level. H2d is sup-
ported in that private companies’ political connection
has a negative influence on companies’ contribution to
government-oriented responsibility. This result supports
the political power hypothesis.
For employee-oriented responsibility, connected com-
panies’ contribution is lower than non-connected private
companies’ at 1 % significance level. H2e is supported in
that private companies’ political connection has a nega-
tive influence on companies’ contribution to employee-
oriented responsibility, which supports that political
connection will cause companies’ moral cost.Regression results on political connection and CSR
From Table 15, political connection has a positive
influence on CSR. However, when CSR is divided by
stakeholders, politically connected companies’ per-
formance is not better than non-political connected
companies’ in any aspect. Companies will judge
differently to satisfy stakeholders’ requirement accord-
ing to their perception of stakeholders’ importance
(Table 16).ion Non-political Connection
MIN MAX MEAN SD MIN MAX
18.474 24.586 21.410 1.155 18.474 24.586
−0.161 0.338 0.064 0.070 −0.161 0.338
0.000 1.000 0.244 0.429 0.000 1.000
0.001 0.654 0.224 0.154 0.001 0.654
−0.796 7.766 0.244 0.939 −0.796 7.766
Table 13 Correlation analysis
CSR SOCR CUSO EMPO GOVO INVO POLC INS SIZE ROA DUAL FIX GROW
CSR 1
SOCR 0.137*** 1
CUSO 0.130*** −0.216*** 1
EMPO 0.192*** 0.080*** −0.282*** 1
GOVO 0.414*** 0.282*** −0.441*** 0.230*** 1
INVO 0.424*** 0.166*** −0.208*** 0.126*** 0.449*** 1
POLC 0.067*** 0.100*** 0.037* −0.119*** −0.010 0.045** 1
INS −0.015 −0.042* 0.043** −0.040** −0.102*** −0.058*** −0.010 1
SIZE 0.045** 0.003 0.083*** −0.293*** 0.044** 0.278*** 0.124*** 0.062*** 1
ROA −0.079*** 0.082*** −0.299*** −0.024 0.117*** 0.019 0.033 0.063*** 0.109*** 1
DUAL 0.008 −0.004 −0.019 0.081*** −0.010 −0.031 −0.062*** 0.061*** −0.122*** −0.001 1
FIX −0.271*** −0.089*** 0.176*** −0.026 −0.269*** −0.176*** −0.033*** −0.079*** −0.058*** −0.112*** 0.025 1
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determine the salience through stakeholders’ legitimacy,
urgency, and power.
For politically connected companies, after their connec-
tion with the government, government’s salience in-
creases. From power’s perspective, connected companies’
dependence on key resources controlled by governmentTable 14 Regression results of H1 and H2
CSR SOCO INVO
Hypotheses H1 H2a H2b
POLC 0.058*** 2.366*** 0.002
(0.019) (0.665) (0.00
SIZE −0.0120 −0.459 0.011
(0.012) (0.288) (0.00
ROA −0.567*** 14.217*** −0.0
(0.212) (4.425) (0.02
DUAL 0.036 0.044 0.001
(0.023) (0.613) (0.00
GROW −0.039** −0.348 −0.0
(0.016) (0.413) (0.00
FIX −0.560*** −6.131*** −0.0
(0.071) (2.062) (0.00
YEAR Yes Yes Yes
IND Yes Yes Yes
R2 17.85 % 7.29 % 25.97
Observation 2180 1790 2180
() Robust standard error
***P < 0.01
**P < 0.05
*P < 0.1increases and then the relative power also increases. From
urgency’s perspective, government influences companies
and make its requirements and problems seen easily by
companies and government can also use key resources to
threaten companies to increase authority. For govern-
ment, it does not only ask companies to pay taxes on time,
but also needs them to help solve problems, which cannotCUSO GOVO EMPO
H2c H2d H2e
0.014* −0.006* −0.014***
2) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
*** 0.012*** −0.002 −0.025***
1) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
00 −0.757*** 0.139*** −0.023
1) (0.072) (0.031) (0.038)
0.004 −0.002 0.002
3) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
06*** −0.013** −0.005** −0.015***
1) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
33*** 0.111*** −0.087*** −0.003
9) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014)
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
% 27.36 % 24.57 % 26.43 %
2180 2180 2180
Table 15 Test result of H1 and H2
Hypotheses Dependent Variable Content Regression Result
H1 CSR PC > NPC PC > NPC(***)
H2a SOCO PC > NPC PC > NPC(***)
H2b INVO PC > NPC PC > NPC
H2c CUSO PC > NPC PC > NPC(*)
H2d GOVO PC < NPC PC < NPC(*)
H2e EMPO PC < NPC PC < NPC(***)
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mainly consist of society-oriented problems (Xin 2008).
Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR thinks that philanthropic re-
sponsibility is at the top of the pyramid, which can more
easily get approval and is the important channel for man-
agers to build and maintain political connection (Ma &
Parish 2006). Politically connected companies can use
philanthropic investment to get more developing oppor-
tunities and tax preference from government in return.
Therefore, compared with non-connected companies,
connected companies will contribute more on society-
oriented responsibility and less on government-oriented
responsibility because of political power effect.
Employees, especially the talented, are essential to gov-
ernment’s survival and development. They are the mainTable 16 Robust Regression Result of H1 and H2
CSR SOCO INVO
Hypotheses H1 H2a H2b
POLC 0.017*** 0.434*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.158) (0.00
SIZE −0.013 −0.467 0.011
(0.011) (0.291) (0.00
ROA −0.570*** 14.295*** −0.0
(0.212) (4.418) (0.02
DUAL 0.036 0.021 0.000
(0.022) (0.617) (0.00
GROW −0.039** −0.339 −0.0
(0.016) (0.415) (0.00
FIX −0.564*** −6.326*** −0.0
(0.070) (2.069) (0.00
YEAR Yes Yes Yes
IND Yes Yes Yes
R2 17.94 % 6.86 % 26.00
Observation 2180 1790 2180
() Robust standard error
***P < 0.01
**P < 0.05
*P < 0.1producer and producer of products and service. The cre-
ativity and initiative of employees directly affected com-
panies’ level of competitiveness. They can use their
resources to pressure companies to address their urgent
requirements (Wang & Zhang 2003). However, when a
company builds a connection with the government, its
selectable channels to obtain resources increase and em-
ployees’ relative salience decreases because the relative
power decreases and its urgency also decreases as em-
ployees’ requirement is less visible by the company and
managers. However, for unconnected companies, in
order to survive and develop, it must broaden its appeal
to talents and build core teams with higher skills, which
means increasing the investment in employee and em-
ployee’s salience to these unconnected companies.
For investors, as companies’ direct capital supplier,
they have a close connection with companies and have
an important influence on companies’ decision-making.
They can use their capital to threaten companies and
protect self-interests. For customers, as the direct cre-
ation of companies’ profit, private companies keep cus-
tomer service orientation and pay close attention to
customers to compete with SOEs and foreign-funded
enterprises without government support. When introdu-
cing political factors, connected companies will get more
customer and media’s attention. Their behavior of harm-
ing customers’ benefit will be enlarged. Therefore, cus-
tomers have more power and ability to affect companies,CUSO GOVO EMPO
H2c H2d H2e
0.005*** −0.002** −0.004***
1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
** 0.011*** −0.002 −0.025***
1) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
01 −0.757*** 0.139*** −0.022
1) (0.072) (0.031) (0.038)
0.004 −0.002 0.002
2) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
06*** −0.013** −0.005** −0.015***
1) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
33*** 0.110*** −0.087*** −0.001
9) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014)
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
% 27.44 % 24.67 % 26.44 %
2180 2180 2180
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nected companies’ performance to customers is better
than non-politically connected companies.
Robust test
To test the results’ robustness, this paper changes the
measurement of political connection. For political con-
nection, this part makes use of the valuation method by
giving the different levels numerical values. Political con-
nection equals to 5 with national connection; equals to 4
with provincial connection; equals to 3 with municipal
connection; equals to 2 with county-level connection;
equals to 1 with township-level connection; and equals
to 0 with no connection (Du et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2014).
For H1 and H2, besides the significance level of polit-
ical connection’s coefficients, customer orientation and
government orientation increase, the other political con-
nection’s coefficients’ sign and significance level do not
change. From the regression results, when a company
has a higher political connection level, it would contri-
bution more to CSR and society-oriented and customer-
oriented responsibility, and less on employee-oriented
and government-oriented responsibility.
From above analysis, this paper’s regression model and
results are robust.
Conclusion
This paper uses non-financial A-share listed private
companies from 2008 to 2014 as samples and analyzes
the influence of political connection on CSR under dif-
ferent stakeholder orientation. The paper finds that pol-
itical connection has a positive influence on private
companies’ CSR (H1). However, if we divide the com-
panies' social responsibility by diverse stakeholders, we
find that H1 is valid for some certain stakeholder-
oriented responsibility, but for some other stakeholder-
oriented responsibility,H1 is not valid. The above results
partially support H2: political connected and non-
political connected companies will choose and satisfy a
certain stakeholder preferentially according to the im-
portance of stakeholders. The companies with political
connection are significantly better than the ones without
political connection at society-oriented and customers-
oriented responsibility. The two kinds of companies have
no significant difference at investors-oriented responsi-
bility. As for government-oriented and employee-
oriented responsibility, the companies with political con-
nection are worse than the ones without political con-
nection. There are two reasons from the perspective of
the dynamic stakeholder salience.
China is still facing many institutional environmental
problems, which have a far-reaching influence on private
companies. Private companies have faced unfair treat-
ment for a long time and have no chance but to buildpolitical connections with government. It is more im-
portant for government to build a fair competitive envir-
onment and a sound legal system environment for
private companies and guide them to establish a sys-
tematical social responsibility strategy. Specifically, im-
proving the institutional environment and giving more
attention to the relationship between the Chinese gov-
ernment and enterprises are necessary for an economic
reform. Then, the government should guide private
companies to establish social responsibility strategy, im-
prove labors protection system and bargaining power,
which help to crack down the "moral cost" issue caused
by political connections. For companies, during the per-
formance of corporate social responsibility, companies
should distinguish the core stakeholders according to
their own characteristics. Companies should know which
stakeholder is most important and establish viable rela-
tionships to promote sustainable development.
Both CSR and stakeholders’ theories are complicated
academic theories. Researchers have different views. This
paper inevitably has some limitations, reflected in the fol-
lowing several points. Firstly, this paper’s design indicators
for CSR are from a financial perspective. However, finan-
cial statements are disclosed by companies independently,
which only reflects its operating and financial results.
Consequently, it may be not comprehensive and objective
enough to measure the performance of social responsibil-
ity. Secondly, this paper only considers political connections
disclosed in executives’ resume and neglects recessive polit-
ical connections. Although this paper values and studies
different levels of political connections, it does not distin-
guish government-type officials and delegate-type officials
and then study the influence of different types of officials
on the performance of corporate social responsibility.
Based on the above problems, further research can
focus on the following points.
(1)Establish more comprehensive and objective
indicators to measure the performance of corporate
and stakeholders’ social responsibility.
(2)Distinguish different types of political connections
and discuss the influence of government-type polit-
ical connections and delegate-type political connec-
tions on the performance of fulfilling stakeholders-
oriented responsibility.
(3)The degree of importance of different stakeholders
perceived by companies and the difference for
companies to meet stakeholders' demand at various
levels are reflected in corporate operating
performance. Operating performance can be added
in future research. Further research can test whether
corporate choice's change brought by political
connections will improve corporate performance, a
more realistic significance.
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